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Abstract
Influencing masses is one way of achieving military and political goals. As seen in 
the U.S. 2016 election campaign, adversaries are prepared to go great length to test 
new ways of battle. When event such as terrorist attack or natural disaster strikes, 
people are prone to believe anything they see without questioning the source or 
truthfulness of information. This work focuses on researching steps necessary to be 
performed by adversaries aiming to perform influence operation by method of placing 
malicious comments on websites. Potential adversary must evaluate target, identify 
most relevant websites and analyse commenting systems to make decision how to 
exploit them. Once adversaries choose course of action, their next step is creation 
of trustworthy, in this case Facebook profiles, which later can be used for malicious 
operations. For purpose of testing this methodology, vulnerability assessment of the 
Croatian webspace is performed, and Facebook as a dominant platform for writing 
comments is identified. In conclusion a formula for estimation of workforce required 
for creation and maintenance of false Facebook profiles is given. Knowledge about 
adversaries’ action is essential for effective defence in hybrid warfare environment. 
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Hybrid warfare is if not always, then at least very often performed by 
influencing masses. Although information warfare in military terms is not a 
new term, its usage in cyberspace is
 relatively new. Both NATO and Russian military doctrine recognise 
cyberspace, in 2016 NATO defined cyberspace as “Domain of Operations” 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2016) and Russian Military doctrine 
form 2010 allows shaping of favourable reaction via means of information 
warfare (Russian Federation, 2010). It is important to note that in west, cyber 
security and information security are separated, considered to be two different 
fields. In Russia cyber is a part of information security (Jaitner, 2015). One 
of many kinds of information operations is by writing malicious comments 
on regular news web sites with goal of shaping favourable public opinion. 
These comments can be bias to some topic, they can be used for: spreading 
false information, rumours, encouraging society division etc. Spread of 
false information can be explained through example of Trojan horse, where 
Trojan citizens themselves, after being influenced and persuaded by single 
individual (an agent for spreading influence – an mediator), brought in a 
wooden horse (bearer of misinformation) in their city, Trojans were acting 
like “resonance boxes” spreading misinformation from one to another until 
they all thought that bringing wooden horse in city is a good idea (Volkov, 
2002). According to (Vojak, 2017), false information can also be accidental: 
viral fake news or irresponsible media, or intentional: for profit or fake news 
as an agent of chaos or influence. Examples of false information are described 
in great detail in work (Vojak, 2017). 
This work aims to identify attack preparation process of adversary wanting 
to prepare small-scale attack modelled after case of U.S. 2016. election and 
influence operation conducted by Internet Research Agency (IRA). Case of 
IRA is well known and documented inside of U.S. but there are no works 
which describe how vulnerable Croatian society would be to similar, but 
simplified campaign, limited only to writing comments on webpages. 
This work assesses vulnerability of Croatian websites on hypothetical small-
scale information influence operation, modelled after IRAs campaign, where 
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adversary wants to shape and destabilise public trust only by mean of writing 
forged user comments on web portals containing news or news related web 
pages. For average user these comments and personas behind them need 
to appear as written by real persons, so it is assumed that attacker will use 
convincingly forged fake social networking accounts, mimicking real user 
behaviour.
This work is structured as follows: First, the tactics of IRA are examined, 
followed by a general revision of the options for placing comments on 
websites. In the next chapter, for the purpose of testing possible adversary 
tactics, Croatian news web portals are examined and their commenting 
system analysed. In this chapter, Facebook will be recognized as a platform 
that allows reaching the majority of websites. Assuming that a potential 
adversary will try to imitate a real Croatian Facebook user, a model of 
the average Croatian Facebook user is given. Since the adversaries wants 
to protect their fake accounts from detection, an overview of Facebook’s 
countermeasures regarding the detection of such accounts is given. This is 
followed by an examination of challenges adversary faces during operation. 
The paper concludes with a model that estimates the size of group required 
to maintain malicious accounts before activation. 
Scenario role model: Internet research Agency
Majority sources regarding Internet Research Agency (IRA) are coming from 
court cases and from research journalism. This chapter aims to summarize 
available data regarding this institution and tries to give an objective 
description of the operation conducted. Institution known as Internet 
Research Agency (IRA) was situated in St Petersburg, Russia. This institution 
employed civilians, and performed highly complex large-scale influence 
campaign through usage of social media: groups, ads, user status updates, 
mems, and among other, by comments on mass media portals and social 
networks – Troll farms (Chen, 2015; United States District Court for The 
District of Columbia, 2018; U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, 2019). Goal 
of the campaign was to divide Americans among themselves by initiating 
and amplifying existing divisions in society. 
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Tactics used by IRA can be shortly described as: high volume and multiple 
channels. IRA used both: fake and stolen social media profiles. Each employee 
was responsible for maintenance of multiple online social network (OSNs) 
profiles and had received daily tasks with topics for coverage, with a daily 
quota to meet. According to (Chen, 2015) daily targets for employees were: 10 
non-political posts, 5 political posts and 150 to 200 comments on co-workers’ 
posts to make their, fake, profiles look legit. Operators (employees) received 
training on local American narrative and current topics. Team leaders ensured 
daily targets are met. Operators were never in direct contact with IRA’s 
“upper” departments, departments assigned with monitoring and giving 
objectives. IRA’s large-scale operation used almost all available online social 
networks, internet platforms and even creating cross platform connections 
between forged accounts to make accounts more believable, examples are: 
Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, YouTube, LinkedIn, Vine, Tumblr, 4chan, 9gag, 
Gmail, Pinterest, Gab, Meetup, VKontakte, LiveJournual. Desired effect was 
to cause information overload and overwhelm target audience (Chen, 2015; 
U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, 2019). 
In 2018 the United States District court for the district of Columbia filed a 
criminal case against IRA and its affiliates for purpose of influencing federal 
elections during period from 2014 to present day (United States District 
Court for The District of Columbia, 2018). IRA and associates were accused 
for “…posing as U.S. persons and creating false U.S. personas, operated 
social media pages and groups designed to attract U.S. audiences.” (United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, 2018). Among other, IRA 
was accused for: using stolen identities of real U.S. persons, traveling to U.S. 
for intelligence purpose, using computer infrastructure partly based in the 
U.S. to hide Russian origin, buying political advertisements on social media, 
staging political rallies inside the U.S., all stated by operating through a 
number of Russian related entities. 
Organisation was headed by management group organized in different 
departments such as: data analysis, search engine optimisation, IT 
department, graphic department, and finance department. Organisation 
regularly evaluated its content to ensure that all posts and operations 
appeared as of authentic U.S. personas. Online social media accounts had 
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hierarchy and some accounts were used to promote another. To obscure 
operators’ true location and to make them appear as they were operating 
from inside of U.S. they used computer space on servers located in the U.S. 
and connected them via virtual private networks (VPNs). It is estimated that 
IRA managed to abuse Facebook ad system by carefully placing targeted 
divisive ads, ads that were 10 times more effective than standard ads (Ribeiro 
et al., 2019). Some analysis of IRA’s Twitter accounts points to existence of 
standardized accounts types named: Right Troll, Left Troll, Newsfeed, Hashtag 
Gamer, Fearmonger depending on topics dominating on these accounts 
(Linvill and Warren, 2018).
According to available data, it is clear that IRA was well funded, well 
organised, with clear goals and working in conjunction with Russian Main 
Intelligence Directorate (GRU) (U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, 2019). 
GRU’s hacking group (advanced persistent threat group known by name 
APT28) role was to obtain sensitive documents by hacking “employees of 
major U.S. political campaigns” (U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, 2019) 
and in assistance with later release of stolen documents with IRA. 
Online social network profiles used by actors like one described in case 
of IRA are hard to distinguish from real accounts because behind them 
is human and these profiles to untrained eye act completely normal until 
activated. Organisations like IRA monitor language skills of their employees 
and adjust their working schedule according to time zone of targeted 
geographic area. Although IRA was shut down, it not likely that it is the 
only organisation conducting these kinds of information operations. In U.S. 
Congress committee report stated that ability to identify Russian activity on 
social media platforms was limited and reliant on social media companies 
to identify these threats (U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, 2019) meaning 
that without close cooperation with private organisations it is very difficult to 
identify these threats. Other researches have also pointed out that although 
methods for detection of malicious accounts do exist, those methods are 
relying on analysing data that is only available to social networks themselves, 
and generally not available to other parties (Adewole et al., 2017; Wani and 
Jabin, 2018; Hannah, 2020)online social networks (OSNs.
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Options for placing comments on websites
Web sites enable their users to place comments on their pages to encourage 
discussions, increase traffic to websites, and even as source of information 
for their articles. From technical perspective, administrators can implement 
commenting systems using different methods. To make whole process simpler 
and to gain higher volume of user comments website may have no registration 
policy, meaning that any visitor to webpage can make comments to articles. 
Trade of this approach is higher time spent in moderation of user comments 
and comments lack of quality. Websites regularly perform moderation of 
user comments due to: house rules, profanities, spam, hate speech, divisive 
speech and fake news (Reich, 2011). Some of stated reasons for moderation, 
such as profanities, are easy to perform by usage of automated filters, but 
regardless of level of automation the whole process is both: time and resource 
consuming for website owner. For websites, first step of moderation is to 
decide how users can make comments as shown in Figure 1. Web sites have 
options to leave anonymous commenting without account, use their own 
account system, or use social media account for login (Limba and Šidlauskas, 
2018)data may spread through cyber space at the speed of lightning. News 
portals constantly update the information available at their disposal by 
posting new articles. In order to attract new readers and to retain existing 
ones, in addition to focussing on publishing quality content, portal managers 
work on continuously improving their sites. These websites may have various 
interactive features, among them the opportunity to comment on an article. In 
some news portals, the number of anonymous comments is particularly high. 
The activities of online commenters and the issues related to their anonymity 
have always generated heated discussion owing to a number of reasons, 
including the content of the comments, the right of the commenters to remain 
anonymous and the extent to which the portal manager could be held liable. 
News portals equipped with an anonymous commenting function give rise 
to a culture of online bullying and hate-mongering where the cyber-criminals 
feel immune from punishment and existing control measures are insufficient 
for addressing the problem. The advocates of anonymous commenting argue 
that it promotes freedom of expression and portal administrators claim they 
can control defamatory and offensive anonymous comments by deleting 
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them. The article discusses the theoretical aspects of anonymity, anonymous 
commenting and anonymous comments. Based on a case study of the most 
popular news portals in Lithuania, and, in particular, on a comparative 
analysis of the privacy policy and the environment for commenting in three 
of them, the authors offer empirical data on the ratio between the number of 
comments and that of the commenters. The main purpose of the article is to 
reveal the peculiarities of anonymous comments’ management of the news 








ge”:”875-889”,”title”:”Peculiarities of anonymous comments’ management: 
a case study of Lithuanian news portals”,”type”:”article-journal”,”volume”:
”5”},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=dca26e7f-c096-
4a07-b34c-6a71ddc2d822”]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Limba and 
Šidlauskas, 2018. In all cases real name of user is not guaranteed. 
figure 1. Model for selecting options for commenting (Limba and Šidlauskas, 2018)data 
may spread through cyber space at the speed of lightning. 
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News portals constantly update the information available at their disposal 
by posting new articles. In order to attract new readers and to retain 
existing ones, in addition to focussing on publishing quality content, portal 
managers work on continuously improving their sites. These websites may 
have various interactive features, among them the opportunity to comment 
on an article. In some news portals, the number of anonymous comments 
is particularly high. The activities of online commenters and the issues 
related to their anonymity have always generated heated discussion owing 
to a number of reasons, including the content of the comments, the right of 
the commenters to remain anonymous and the extent to which the portal 
manager could be held liable. News portals equipped with an anonymous 
commenting function give rise to a culture of online bullying and hate-
mongering where the cyber-criminals feel immune from punishment and 
existing control measures are insufficient for addressing the problem. The 
advocates of anonymous commenting argue that it promotes freedom of 
expression and portal administrators claim they can control defamatory and 
offensive anonymous comments by deleting them. The article discusses the 
theoretical aspects of anonymity, anonymous commenting and anonymous 
comments. Based on a case study of the most popular news portals in 
Lithuania, and, in particular, on a comparative analysis of the privacy 
policy and the environment for commenting in three of them, the authors 
offer empirical data on the ratio between the number of comments and 
that of the commenters. The main purpose of the article is to reveal the 
peculiarities of anonymous comments’ management of the news portals that 








ge”:”875-889”,”title”:”Peculiarities of anonymous comments’ management: 
a case study of Lithuanian news portals”,”type”:”article-journal”,”volume
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”:”5”},”uris”:[“http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=dca26e7f-
c096-4a07-b34c-6a71ddc2d822”]}],”mendeley”:{“formattedCitation”:”(Lim
ba and Šidlauskas, 2018
Websites tend to use social networking account login systems to broaden the 
audience. Users do not have to go through registration process, remember 
usernames and passwords. All user needs to do is to login using existing 
social networking account and it is immediately set to place comments. This 
approach is beneficial for both web pages and users: web site administrators 
do not have to worry about user’s registration process, email addresses, 
forgotten passwords, securely storing users’ passwords etc. Using social 
media plugin for login or commenting is also a measure of reducing spam 
and increasing creditability of comments because each user is signed with, 
assumingly, real name and surname, often has profile picture attached. For 
every placed comment it is visible who is the author, and the author’s public 
social media profile is available to every other user resulting in more credible 
comments. Web site administrators leave user verification to another party 
– social networking site. Additional benefit is that web pages get data about 
visitors needed for advertisement purposes. On the other hand, some users 
care more about privacy and they are not willing to share their identity. It is 
important to note that online social networking sites have full access to user 
activity. 
Analysis of Croatian’s news web portals
In this hypothetical scenario, adversary wants to influence public by placing 
comments on websites. At least to the author, there is no known data or 
methodology on how to prepare for this kind of operation, nor how it is done 
in practice. In this situation, best method is to try to think like adversary 
would. As one of first steps of any successful operation is intelligence 
preparation, adversary is likely to ask following questions: 
•	 how many relevant news related web sites exist in targeted area, 
•	 how many of them enable their readers to comment on articles, and 
•	 how do websites manage user accounts. 
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For purpose of testing this approach, in following text Croatian webspace 
will be analysed. To identify most influential news web pages, first step is 
to identify valid data source regarding websites visits. In case of Croatia, 
largest publicly available dataset is available via Gemius.com2 service. For 
purpose of identification of most relevant Croatian websites at the time of 
writing this article data for month of November of 2019 was used (Gemius 
S.A., 2020). The goal was to reduce list of websites to only relevant sites 
and to discard minor websites with low traffic and activity. From initial 
list of web sites, only sites with 100 000 unique visits during observed 
month were analysed. Furthermore, Gemius public dataset is not limited 
to websites containing news, so websites focused on: fashion, sports, cars, 
health concerns, family or children advices are excluded from analysis 
because they are not relevant, as they have low possibility of political 
influence via method of placing comments. After applying described filters, 
from initial list of 54 web portals with more than 100 000 visits, 18 of them 
were dismissed due to non-political content. During initial review it was 
noticed that some popular portals are missing from the list because they 
do not participate in Gemius program. To objectively supplement Gemius 
dataset, an alternative list of most visited websites called SimilarWeb3 was 
used (SimilarWeb LTD, 2020b). In alternative list, only basic information is 
offered free of charge, and furthermore, SimmilarWeb uses different visitor 
counting methodology meaning that visit data present in the SimilarWeb 
dataset is not directly comparable to visit data in the Gemius dataset. After 
data review, two websites (index.hr and forum.hr) were added into analysis, 
but due to different visitor data methodology their visit numbers will not be 
considered in a latter discussion. Real adversary would likely have access 
to data behind paywall and thus could use single data source, nevertheless 
the methodology for determining relevant websites is unaffected. In total, 
38 Croatian news web sites were analysed (Table 1.) with over 200 million 
2  Gemius dataset is created by collecting cookie and browser data for advertising purpose 
and, among other information, gives information of unique visits during months period. Data 
is available for following countries: Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia.
3  SimmilarWeb is web analytic platform which gathers worldwide data regarding websites 
traffic, referral sources by usage of different methods.
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views during one observed month. Each site was visited, and following 
topics were assessed:
•	 Are visitors allowed to post comments?
•	 If comments are enabled, what method is used:
– proprietary commenting system (website account), 
– Facebook login or Facebook commenting plug in,
– Google login,
– no registration required.
Table 1. Commenting system on most visited Croatian web sites as December 2019,  













1 24sata.hr 40.82 Yes Yes Yes Yes No
2 net.hr 26.29 Yes Yes No No No
3 vecernji.hr 23.66 Yes Yes No Yes No
4 dnevnik.hr 20.92 Yes Yes No No No
5 rtl.hr 16.87 Yes Yes No No No
6 tportal.hr 15.73 Yes Yes No No No
7 telegram.hr 7.67 Yes Yes No No No
8 dnevno.hr 7.16 Yes Yes No No No
9 novilist.hr 4.62 Yes Yes No No No
10 express.hr 3.73 Yes Yes No Yes No
11 poslovni.hr 3.54 Yes No No Yes No
12 dalmatinskiportal.hr 3.27 No / / / /
13 direktno.hr 2.72 Yes Yes No No No
14 glasistre.hr 2.69 No / / / /
15 n1info.com 2.53 Yes No No No Yes
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16 dalmacijadanas.hr 2.44 Yes No No No Yes
17 srednja.hr 2.07 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
18 hrt.hr 2.00 No / / / /
19 klik.hr 1.60 No / / / /
20 sibenik.in 1.30 Yes Yes No No No
21 podravski.hr 1.21 No / / / /
22 zagreb.info 1.17 Yes Yes No No No
23 epodravina.hr 1.03 Yes Yes No No No
24 istarski.hr 0.87 Yes No No Yes No
25 bug.hr 0.85 Yes No No Yes No
26 prigorski.hr 0.74 No / / / /
27 glas-slavonije.hr 0.73 Yes Yes No No No
28 zagorje.com 0.69 Yes Yes No No No
29 mirovina.hr 0.65 Yes Yes No No No
30 057info.hr 0.63 Yes No No Yes No
31 sbplus.hr 0.54 Yes No No Yes No
32 teen385.com 0.37 Yes No No Yes No
33 ebrod.net 0.36 Yes Yes No No No
34 lider.media 0.28 Yes Yes No No No
35 mojfaks.com 0.22 Yes Yes No No No
36 studentski.hr 0.18 Yes Yes No No No
/ index.hr* n/a Yes Yes No No No
/ forum.hr** n/a Yes*** No No Yes No
Total: 202.15 32 23 2 11 3
Percentage of sites: 84.21% 68.75% 5.23% 28.95% 7.89%
*index.hr does not use same visit data methodology as other sites (Index promocija d.o.o., 2015),
**forum.hr does use Gemius service, but visit data is not publicly available,
***forum.hr is a popular bulletin board, not a news website as such.
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In total, 84% of observed websites enable users to post comments. Users with 
online social networks account can post comments on 69% of observed sites. 
Due to uneven visit distribution, number of websites enabling commenting 
option is not a valid measure. By comparing website views instead, it is 
possible observe real reach of social network accounts in Croatian websites. 
In Figure 2, a ratio between visits to websites in regard of options for 
commenting: Facebook commenting, other mean of commenting or no 
commenting is shown. By analysing ratio between sum page views on all 
websites enabling comments and sum page views of all websites that enables 
login via Facebook platform, we come to result that out of total 190 million 
views on sites with comments enabled, 179 million views or around4 94% 
are websites using Facebook platform. All results of websites evaluation are 
shown in Table 1. 
figure 2. Distribution of commenting options compared to total website visits in 
observed time period, number in brackets shows number of visits in observed month
4  Directly comparable visit data for index.hr and forum.hr is not available, other publicly 
available data states that index.hr has around 50 million visits and forum.hr around 5 
million visits per month (SimilarWeb LTD, 2020a). Since index.hr does use Facebook plugin 
and forum.hr does not, when we take visit numbers into account, then we are dealing with 
roughly 230 million visits with Facebook plugin and 17 million using different means, looking 
the data this way total reach by Facebook plugin is higher (230 millions), but percentage is 
slightly lower at approximately 93%.
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In conclusion, for potential adversary aiming to place comments on Croatian 
websites, Facebook social media account is identified as most viable option. 
By using single Facebook account adversary can have access to 94% of totally 
viewed webpages which enable users to make comments (in observed time 
period). In this way adversary can use one account to access almost all 
webpages without necessity dozens of different accounts. Main disadvantage 
of this centralised approach can be viewed in following: if Facebook account 
is compromised, then attacker will no longer have access to all websites 
where account was used to post comments.
facebook as dominant platform
Modelling of average Facebook user in targeted area
As shown in previous chapter, Facebook is identified as a dominant platform 
in Croatian society, especially for enabling placement of user comments on 
websites. Adversary aiming to exploit commenting system via Facebook 
accounts wants to create convincing Facebook accounts, mimicking real 
user daily behaviour with goal of making Facebook automated fake account 
detection more difficult. Adversaries next step is modelling of average 
Facebook user in targeted area. Most of publicly available data regarding 
Facebook users is aimed for marketing purposes. Most public reports do not 
state methodology of information collecting, they focus on different users’ 
habits and present statistics of users living in different countries, using 
different time periods thus making direct comparison difficult. Not all data 
is available for all geographical regions, making Facebook user modelling 
using publicly available data difficult.
To make assumption on average Croatian Facebook user following publicly 
available data was used:
•	 average Croatian comments other users status update five time a 
month - 0.16 status comments per day (Arbona d.o.o., 2019),
•	 average Croatian user makes one status share per month (Arbona 
d.o.o., 2019),
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•	 average Croatian user likes one page per month (Arbona d.o.o., 
2019),
•	 average Croatian 17 times per month visits advertised web pages 
(Arbona d.o.o., 2019),
•	 data regarding average Facebook usage time for Croatian user is not 
publicly available, but we can approximate it using knowledge that 
during 2019. average U.S. Facebook user older than 18 years spent 
37 minutes5 a day using Facebook (Droesch and eMarketer, 2019),
•	 in addition, as beginning of 2019 Croatia had 1.9 million of 
Facebook users, 1.1 million of Instagram users and 168.5 thousand 
of Twitter users (Hootsuite, 2019).
According to available data, results reveals that although most websites 
offer for their users to use Facebook for placing comments, average Croatian 
Facebook user is not very active, and for potential adversary it would be 
relatively easy to mimic real user behaviour. One person could maintain 
relatively large number of fake profiles.
Facebook measures against fake accounts
Facebook itself is aware of platform exploits and it is fighting against 
“Inauthentic Behaviour”, and in one such report stating that Facebook 
removed 50 networks of such accounts worldwide (Rosen et al., 2019). As 
one measure filters detecting accounts and pages who repeatedly share 
confirmed misinformation6 are installed without noting if this measure is 
language dependent. Most of these measures are aimed toward to 2020 US 
elections although Facebook representative in one report stated that they 
removed 36 suspicious French accounts posting about various political topics 
5  Measured time includes all time spend on social platform regardless of user multitasking, 
meaning that social platform has been accessed for 37 minutes in average while user could 
have done other things simultaneously, for example having opened multiple tabs in web 
browser (Droesch and eMarketer, 2019).
6  Authors of the report do not distinguish between terms misinformation (false or wrong 
information which are accidentally transmitted and which can lead to damage –  not sent with intent) 
and disinformation (false or wrong information sent with intention of influencing opinion in favour of 
person who is sending information) (Tuđman, 2012)
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(Gleicher and Facebook, 2018). It is noted that that recent accounts used to 
spread influence are more sophisticated and harder to detect than those in 
case of IRA (Facebook, 2018). Attribution of malicious accounts is difficult 
because actors behind them (like IRA or some other groups) improve their 
techniques once being uncovered. Facebook attributes actors in four general 
categories based on: (1) Political motivations, (2) Coordination, (3) Tools, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and (4) Technical Forensics (Stamos and 
Facebook, 2018). In report (Rosen and Facebook, 2019) Facebook estimates 
that 5% monthly active accounts are fake accounts without stating are 
they automated, bot accounts or connected in any measure with politically 
motivated accounts. During a period from January to September of 2019 
5.4 billion, mostly automated fake accounts have been disabled (Facebook, 
2019). 
Facebook does not publicly disclaim technical details on how are they 
discovering fake accounts, giving only few technical examples such as: 
blocking certain IP addresses and even ranges if they detect large number 
on new accounts originating from that IP, network or location, removing 
accounts using suspicious email addresses and actions, removing accounts 
if other users report it as fake (Facebook and Schultz, 2019). As previously 
noted, in U.S. Congress committee report it is stated that detection of 
malicious accounts is reliant on social media companies themselves and 




As Facebook has been identified as a dominant platform, in this chapter 
focus is given on adversary challenges regarding creation of fake Facebook 
profiles. Adversary can create many fake profiles at once, but if he does so, 
it is likely that this action will trigger suspicion. To create profiles which are 
both: convincing and difficult to automatically detect, it is likely that they 
will be gradually created over time, long before information operation itself. 
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These accounts can be created and maintained for years, and weaponized 
when needed. From different types of possible accounts types described in 
detail (Adewole et al., 2017; Wani and Jabin, 2018)online social networks 
(OSNs, in this case we will focus on manual creation of accounts. These 
accounts can be created either by using non existing identities, by using 
stolen personal information or by usage of existing but stolen social network 
accounts7. Adversary aims to craft and maintain accounts in such way to 
deter automatic detection. For example, for Facebook it would be easy to 
detect large number of accounts that have been inactive for years and then 
suddenly activated at once. As result, adversary must maintain activity 
on forged, fake accounts even when not in use for they intended purpose. 
Adversary will likely use both fake and stolen identities for creation of social 
network profiles. At time of writing, Facebook procedure for reporting 
usage of stolen identity states that victim itself must report identity theft and 
provide evidence for identity theft in form of a personal document, otherwise 
request won’t be considered by Facebook (Facebook, 2020). Knowledge 
about this relatively complicated procedure makes usage of stolen identities 
by adversary more likely. Adversary will likely exploit fact that detection of 
fake profiles is reliant of social network providers meaning that attacked side 
will have problems defending against such attacks as visible in examples 
presented in (Hannah, 2020).
Depending on adversary intentions, it can perform small scale operation by 
placing targeted comments on selected topics at targeted geographical area 
and thus attract less attention and suspicion from intended victim, potentially 
making this kind of operation very effective. If adversary engages in larger 
operation it is more likely to gain higher attention, potentially leading to 
state officials starting to investigate links of comments and user accounts 
possibly leading to compromise of whole operation.
Adversary wants to have reliable social media accounts, accounts which 
will not trigger suspicion when inspected by both: average user and some 
automated detection system. Those accounts need to be specially tailored 
7  According to (Ablon, Libicki and Abler, 2014) on black market stolen social network 
profiles can have greater value than stolen credit card information.
Dalibor Gernhardt
56
to meet specific mission requirements. As discussed in earlier chapters, 
adversary must find a way to mitigate commonly used detection methods 
and it is likely to deal with following challenges:
•	 as each IP address reveals its approximate physical (geographical) 
location, accounts need to obscure their physical location to deter 
automatic detection (one mean of achieving this is by using multiple 
VPN connections to multiple densely populated areas to avoid 
correlation of accounts due to location proximity and behaviour),
•	 avoiding IP and possibly geographical location contact between 
accounts to deter automatic correlation between accounts, accounts 
need to consistently login form similar locations with goal of not 
attracting unwanted attention,
•	 avoiding correlation between accounts time of activity (i.e. accounts 
are often active at the same time),
•	 how to mimic real social media user behaviour with limited data 
regarding real users’ behaviour available,
•	 evaluate and choose best approach to add friends to social media 
accounts: connecting fake accounts in networks or avoid contact 
and try to add real people to its friend list,
•	 adjust hours of activity of fake profiles to those of targeted time 
zone users,
•	 how to achieve a synergistic effect of all accounts,
•	 how to validate effectiveness of operation.
Estimate on personnel necessary for account maintenance
Putting technical challenges aside and knowing these kinds of operations 
have been performed in past, goal of this chapter is to estimate personnel 
resources necessary for maintenance of dormant (relatively inactive – at 
this phase not used for writing malicious comments) accounts. Due to large 
number of possible adversaries’ modus of operandi, only a preparation 
phase (consisting of creation and maintenance of social network accounts) 
is analysed. By comparing publicly available data about average Croatian 
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Facebook user with data regarding accounts used by IRA as shown in Table 
2, it is evident that potential adversary could not directly apply IRAs model 
due to significantly different level of user activity. Comparing to accounts 
used by IRA it is visible that average Croatian user is significantly less active 
and potential adversary could maintain more fake accounts per real person 
compared to IRAs case of six accounts per employee. 
Table 2. Comparison on IrAs social media accounts and average Croatian facebook user, 
data derived from (Seddon, 2014; Chen, 2015; Arbona d.o.o., 2019)
IrAs social media accounts Average Croatian facebook user
10 non-political, five political posts per day one per month
150–200 comments per day five per month
50 comments to news articles no data available
Other, not directly comparable, available data
Each blogger maintains six  
Facebook accounts
Average Croatian user likes one 
page per month
Each blogger maintains 10 Twitter accounts 
with up to 2000 followers  
and 50 tweets a day
If adversary wants to have convincing Facebook accounts at its disposition, 
they need to be maintained 24/7 and especially tailored for specifics of 
certain geographical area. For getting representative value, we will examine 
much workforce is necessary to perform 24/7 operation. Let’s introduce 
following variables:
 Tda  = [minutes per profile] – targeted daily activity (Tda) for single social 
network account,




Wm = [minutes] – amount of daily working time in minutes (Wm) shown per 
employee, for example in case of 8 working hours, excluding brakes, this 
value equals to 480 minutes.
To address necessity of accounts to be active on every day of month regardless 
off weekends, additional factor is introduced Cw – Corrected week. If single 
employees have 5-day workweek then simple ratio of workweek days and 
actual week length will enable us to compensate for weekends, this factor 
can be treated as a constant (1): 
   Cw = 
Numbers of workdays in week 
Numbers of days in week 
 = 5
7
     (1)
As accounts must be maintained in convincing looking 24/7 operation, so 
we need to model different amount activity during day and night period. 
For example, we can assume 90% daily, 10% activity during night, in other 
words, if adversary has 20 persons at its disposal 18 persons will be working 
during daytime and two employees will always be unavailable during 
daytime because they perform night account maintenance (temporarily 
ignoring other factors as they are all modelled as independent). We can 
approximate this by factor of Daily activity (Da):
 Da = [no dimension] – ratio of daytime and night activity, for example, 
a value of 0.9 means that accounts spend 90% of time during daytime. 
In previous steps we have reduced all variables to daily level. Now by simple 
multiplication of variables it is possible to roughly approximate adversary’s 
number of Fake profiles (Fp) with a given constraints. To recap, number of 
Fake profile depends on available workforce (Awf), ratio between day and 
night accounts usage (Da), multiplied by weekend correction factor (Cw of 
5/7) and it is limited by average time that adversary wants to spend working
on each account – WmTda
. If we assume there is no overlap between accounts 
activity (one employee works on one account at any given time) and multiply 
each of factors stated above, we can approximate number of fake profiles (Fp) 
as linear function of multiple variables (2): 
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Given formula (2) takes into consideration necessity for both day and night 
maintenance during every day in a year and as results gives number of 
profiles that could be maintained with given parameters and resources. 
Results depend on available workforce (operators behind profiles), ratio of 
day to night activity and total targeted daily activity of fake profiles. 
We can put this formula to use by assumption that adversary wants to 
perform squad to company sized operation while spending 20, 30 or 40 
minutes daily per fake Facebook profile and by using following values for 
variables:
Awf  = 10 – 120 [number of persons] – squad to company sized operation,
Da = 0.9 [no dimension] – assuming accounts spend 90% of time during daytime,
Cw = 
5
7  [no dimension] – five workdays in a week,
Wm = 480 [min] – assuming each employee works for full 8 hours,
Tda = 20, 30, 40 [min/profile] – comparing 3 cases of activity time.
In case of   Awf  = 10 people and Tda = 40 min/profile:
 Fp = Awf x Da x Cw x 
Wm
Tda  
 = 10 people x 0,9 x 57
 x 480 min
40 min/profile  
≈ 77 profiles       (3)
By using presented methodology, we come to conclusion that with given 
parameters, 10 operators can continuously maintain about 77 profiles. 
Complete results of this hypothetical scenario are shown in Figure 3, due 
to multiple variable influencing results, this result can be used only as a 
rough estimate of personnel necessary for maintenance of dormant account. 
By using selected parameters, we can estimate one platoon sized force (30 
people) can maintain between 232 (for 40 minute a day activity) and 464 (20 
minutes of day activity) of fake Facebook accounts. Due to fact that average 
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Croatian Facebook user is inactive compared to U.S. user (Table 2) time spent 
online on single account could be even shorter that assumed 20, 30 and 40 
minutes per day, resulting in higher number of accounts.
figure 3. Number of dormant facebook accounts depending on available  
workforce and account activity of 20, 30 and 40 minutes per day
This model concentrated only on personnel necessary for working on 
accounts, not on management, logistic or IT staff necessary for creating the 
conditions for operation. Once adversary deploys these accounts (starts 
placing malicious comments) it is difficult to give an estimate on number of 
personnel required due to different nature of every operation, desired goals, 
effect etc. 
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Conclusion
For defence against hybrid warfare, knowledge about threats, adversaries, 
motives, goals, techniques, tactics and procedures is essential. Without 
better understanding of the problem, it is not possible to employ adequate 
defence. As the example of IRA shows, adversaries are prepared to make 
great efforts to achieve their goals by using cyberspace opportunities. This 
paper focuses on one segment of cyber information warfare and attempts to 
identify steps that must be taken by adversary. In case of placing malicious 
comments that is to identify key websites in some countries webspace, 
identify how and when comments should be written and how to exploit 
them later. In test case of Croatia, it is shown that through usage of Facebook 
accounts as primary vector for placing comments it is possible to reach 94% 
of Croatian viewed pages meaning that potential adversary will most likely 
try exploit Facebook platform. Results of evaluation will vary from country 
to country and adversary must assess each country individually. Once 
adversary identifies mode of operation, adversaries’ goal is to mimic real 
users in targeted area and creation of falsely trustworthy accounts which are 
dormant until used for information operation itself. As shown, adversary 
wanting to mimic Facebook user, faces multiple unknowns which can be 
used to reveal malicious activity. Analysis shows adversary aiming to create 
fake Facebook profiles, while not in use, can maintain dozen accounts per 
one operator. Knowledge about adversary steps is essential for planning 
defence against hybrid threats. For future work it is necessary to test same 
or similar methodology to another countries revealing differences between 
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